Recent evidence indicates that surges in capital inflows and credit booms can increase the probability of a subsequent banking crisis. Using a new country-level panel database on financial fragility, we take this analysis further by exploring the interaction of surges, booms and fragility. We find that booms and fragility are both important, but booms increase the probability of a crisis only in financial systems with a relatively high level of fragility.
Introduction
One potential concern with a high rate of growth in bank lending is that it will exacerbate the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that undermine the stability of the banking system, increasing the probability of a banking crisis (Schularick and Taylor, 2012) . There is a similar concern about high rates of growth in foreign capital inflows, either because these inflows fuel excessive growth in bank lending, or because they generate asset price bubbles (Calvo, 2012) . Empirical research indicates that although there is no robust linear relationship between the level of capital inflows and the onset of a crisis, atypical 'surges' in inflows do make a crisis significantly more likely (Caballero, 2014) . Caballero also finds the effect of a surge in capital inflows to be distinct from that of a lending boom, which is consistent with the asset price mechanisms outlined by Calvo.
Using a recently published international database on financial fragility, this paper extends the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, we estimate the probability of a crisis in a given country and given year conditional not only on lending booms and surges in capital inflows, but also on measures of financial fragility. We find that on average, over all countries and years in our sample, the effect of booms (and, to some extent, surges) is robust to the inclusion of fragility measures in the model of crises. However, when we allow the effect of booms to depend on fragility, we find that booms are significant only when fragility is relatively high. Secondly, our model allows for persistence: the probability of a crisis now depends on whether there was a crisis last year, and omitting to account for this effect leads to biased estimates of the other effects in the model.
The Data
Our baseline model estimates the probability of a banking crisis in year t conditional on (i) the presence of credit booms and capital inflow surges in year t-1 and (ii) measures of banking system fragility in year t-1. The dependent variable in this model is a binary measure equal to one if there is a systematic banking crisis in country i in year t, and equal to zero otherwise. This variable, denoted crisis (i,t) , is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2013) . A systematic banking crisis is indicated by (i) substantial financial distress, as reflected in bank runs, excessive bank losses, or bank insolvency, and (ii) a substantial government policy intervention in response to the distress.
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Our credit boom and capital inflow surge variables are based on the method outlined in Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) and Caballero (2014) . Using a cubic spline, 2 we fit trend values of (i) real per capita credit to the private sector and (ii) real per capita foreign direct investment inflows for each country.
Data are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators. The variable credit-boom(i,t) is set equal to one when de-trended real per capita credit to the private sector is more than one standard deviation above zero, and equal to zero otherwise; the variable FDI-surge(i,t) is set equal to one when de-trended real per capita FDI inflows are more than one standard deviation above zero, and equal to zero otherwise. Using broader measures of capital inflows and larger standard deviation cut-off points produces results similar to those reported below; further details are available on request.
Our fragility variables come from two alternative sources: the newly released International
Database on Financial Fragility (IDFF), documented in Andrianova et al. (2015) , and the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), documented in Čihák et al. (2012) . The two databases include the same country-level fragility measures constructed from bank-level data, but differ in the selection rules used to determine whether an individual bank is included in the aggregate. For some country-level variables, the IDFF reports alternative measures based on selection rules of varying 1 'Substantial' is defined as the presence of at least three of the following six outcomes: deposit freezes or bank holidays, bank nationalizations, restructuring costs reaching at least 3% of GDP, asset purchases reaching at least 5% of GDP, liquidity support reaching at least 5% of deposits and liabilities to non-residents, and the introduction of significant government guarantees. We use two alternative country-level variables from the IDFF and GFDD that are inversely related to fragility. The first of these is a z-score aggregating asset returns and equity: 
Here, equity(i,t) is the total value of bank equity in country i in year t, assets(i,t) is the total value of bank assets, return(i,t) is a weighted average of the banks' annual return on these assets, and s (i ) is the standard deviation of return(i,t) over time. This z-score is a country-level analog of the z-score of an individual bank (Laeven and Levine, 2009) , and measures the distance of the whole banking system from insolvency under the assumption that bank profits are normally distributed.
Note that in Laeven and Valencia (2013) , insolvency is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the presence of financial distress: distress can also occur when there are substantial bank runs that do not lead to insolvency. Moreover, bank runs might be triggered even when the banking system is still a long way from insolvency: for example, runs might be triggered by an expectation of a government intervention that freezes bank deposits. Such expectations might be raised simply by a poorly performing banking sector, and for this reason we include return(i,t) as a second inverse-fragility measure alongside z-score (i,t) . Since the IDFF includes alternative estimates of return(i,t), we fit three alternative versions of our model: (i) using the IDFF estimates of z-score(i,t) and their least inclusive estimates of return(i,t), (ii) using the IDFF estimates of z-score(i,t) and their most inclusive estimates of
return(i,t), and (iii) using the GFDD estimates of z-score(i,t) and return(i,t).
In addition to the baseline model, we also fit a model that includes a variety of macroeconomic controls that might be associated with the probability of a banking crisis: the consumer price inflation rate, government spending as a fraction of GDP, the real level of per capita GDP (in logs), the real GDP growth rate, the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness, an indicator of recent capital account liberalization, 3 trade openness (imports plus exports as a fraction of GDP), and the Kaufmann-KraayMastruzzi index of the control of corruption, and the share of the three largest banks in total bank assets.
Data sources for these variables are given in Appendix A.
The Model
Combining the data sources discussed in the previous section, we have an unbalanced panel of 121 countries over a 13-year period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . The number of missing observations depends on which fragility data are used and whether the macroeconomic control variables are included in the model; in the results below, the total sample size varies between 956 and 1,346 observations. Appendix A includes the list of countries and descriptive statistics for the sample. In order to allow for the persistence of crisis(i,t) we fit a dynamic panel Probit model. The fixed-effects specification of the baseline model is:
Here, Φ(.) is the cumulative normal density function, z j ∈ {credit-boom, FDI-boom, return, Z-score}, and ε (i,t) is an error term. Although there is no consistent estimator for the fixed-effects Probit model, the parameters in equation (2) can be estimated consistently using the following random-effects specification of the latent variable y (see Wooldridge, 2005) :
is a normally distributed random effect and z j (i ) is the mean of z j (i,t) over time.
Panel A of Table 1 includes estimates of the β and ϕ parameters in equations (2-3), along with the corresponding t-ratios and marginal effects evaluated at the mean value of Φ (which is 0.09). There are three sets of estimates corresponding to the three alternative fragility measures: (i) IDFF using the least inclusive measure of returns, (ii) IDFF using the most inclusive measure of returns, and (iii) GFDD. It can be seen from panel A that the parameter on the fragility variable z-score is never significantly different from zero, and panels B-C of Table 1 show parameter estimates when either one or other of the fragility variables (z-score or return) is excluded from the model. 4 In no case does the exclusion of either variable make a substantial difference to any of the other parameter estimates. The results across the three different fragility measures are very similar.
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The insignificance of the z-score variable suggests that the country-level distance from insolvency is not in itself a predictor of banking crises; one interpretation of this result is that crises can be triggered long before a country gets close to insolvency. By contrast, the return variable is significant at the 5% level in all of the Table 1 estimates: countries with a more profitable banking sector are significantly less prone to crises. The marginal effect on return is about -0.01: in other words, a one percentage point increase in average returns on assets will reduce the probability of a crisis by about one percentage point, i.e. from 0.09 to 0.08 at the mean. In order to interpret the magnitude of this effect, 4 In panel B (which shows results excluding return) there are only two sets of estimates, because the IDFF reports only one measure of z-score. 5 However, there is some evidence that the IDFF measure of returns explains more of the variation in crisis than does the GFDD measure. When the least inclusive IDFF measure is added to the model using the GFDD measure, the extra variable is significant at the 5% level (p = 0.027 in the note that the standard deviation of return is just over 1.5 percentage points.
There is also a large and statistically significant parameter on credit-boom, which is consistent with the results in Caballero (2014) . The estimated marginal effect implies that on average, a credit boom (which occurs in about 20% of all country-year observations) increases the probability of a crisis by about four percentage points. The parameter on FDI-surge is slightly smaller and significant at the 5% level when the least inclusive IDFF data are used; in other cases, FDI-surge is significant at the 10% level. The estimated marginal effect implies that on average, an FDI surge (which also occurs in about 20% of all observations) increases the probability of a crisis by about two percentage points. Table 1 shows that there is a high level of persistence in the data. The estimated marginal effect on the lagged dependent variable ranges from 0.16 to 0.19. This implies that at the mean (Φ = 0.09), the presence of a crisis in the previous year triples the probability of a crisis in the current year. If the lagged dependent variable is excluded from the model, then the resulting parameter estimate on credit-boom is about 25% larger and the parameter estimate on return is about twice as large. In other words, neglecting the persistence in the crisis data will lead to substantial over-estimation of other effects. Table 2 reports the results of adding the macroeconomic control variables to the right-hand side of equations (2-3). The addition of these variables makes no substantial difference to the estimated parameters on return, credit-boom or lagged crisis. However, the estimated size of the FDI-surge parameter does fall, and this parameter is no longer significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
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Tables 1-2 show estimates of the average effect on the probability of a banking crisis of credit booms, FDI surges and returns across all countries and years in the sample. It is also possible that the effect of surges and booms varies according to the level of returns: a high level of returns may reflect a more robust banking system that is able to withstand any moral hazard or adverse selection effects 6 Nevertheless, as shown in Caballero (2014) , capital inflow surges are significant predictors of crises in models fitted to longer sample periods (but without the fragility variables for which early data are lacking).
attending a surge or boom. The results in Table 3 show some evidence for a significant interaction between the effect of returns and the effect of credit booms. These results are from a model that replaces
returns(i,t-1) with [returns(i,t-1) × I(credit-boom(i,t-1) = 1)] and [returns(i,t-1) × I(credit-boom(i,t-1) = 0)].
The table records both the estimated parameters on these variables and the difference between the parameter values, along with the t-ratio on this difference. The difference is not significant in all cases, but it is significant at the 2% level in the model using the least inclusive IDFF data and the macroeconomic control variables. (This is the specification that produces the best fit according to a pseudo-R 2 statistic.) Here, the parameter estimates imply that the effect of returns on the probability of a crisis is small and statistically insignificant in the absence of a credit boom, but large and statistically significant in the presence of a boom. To put it another way, a higher level of returns mitigates the effect of a boom. This is illustrated in Figure 1 , which shows the implicit credit boom parameter (not the marginal effect) for different values of returns, using the model fitted with the least inclusive IDFF data.
Credit booms make a crisis more likely as long as returns are below about 1.5 percentage points, but have no significant effect at higher levels of returns. Adding similar interaction terms with FDI-surge does not produce any significant parameter estimates, so these results are not shown.
Discussion
Using recently published data on financial fragility, we show that both fragility (as captured by the poor financial performance of banks) and credit booms are important predictors of the probability of a banking crisis, although their effect might be somewhat overstated in estimates that do not allow for persistence in crises. Moreover, it seems to be the combination of fragility with a boom that creates the conditions for a crisis: in the estimates that fit our data the best, a boom by itself (in the absence of fragility) or fragility by itself (in the absence of a boom) does not make a significant difference to the probability of a crisis. As a rule of thumb, if the annual average return on bank assets is greater than 1.5% then large fluctuations in liquidity should not endanger the banking system. To put this figure in context, in our sample, 7 the mean annual return for Canadian banks (excluding the atypical year of 2008) is 2.3%, compared with 0.9% for US banks and -0.5% for Greek ones. Credit booms should be less of a concern in Canada than in countries such as Greece and the United States. models with unobserved heterogeneity. Journal of Applied Econometrics 20(1), 39-54. 
Variables in Tables 1-2 Definition crisis
A binary variable indicting a systematic banking crisis, as in Laeven and Valencia (2013) .
return
The average annual rate of return on bank assets in a country. There are three alternative measures of this variable: ROAA and ROAAR5 from Andrianova et al. (2015) and GFDD.EI.09 from Čihák et al. (2012) . The variables are trimmed at ± five percentage points from their database mean. The data are available at www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics/research/ esrc-dfid-project/financial-fragility-database-excel and http://data.world bank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development.
z-score
This variable is defined in equation (1) of the text. There are two alternative measures of this variable: Z from Andrianova et al. (2015) and GFDD.SI.01 from Čihák et al. (2012) . The variables are trimmed at ± 35 percentage points from their database mean. The data are available at the sites above.
credit-boom
For each country, this variable is constructed by fitting a cubic spline to the 1960-2012 time series for real credit to the private sector (deflated using the GDP deflator): credit-boom = 1 if the de-trended series is greater than one standard deviation above its mean; otherwise credit-boom = 0. Data are from World Bank (2015).
FDI-surge
For each country, this variable is constructed by fitting a cubic spline to the 1960-2012 time series for real inward foreign direct investment (deflated using the GDP deflator): FDI-surge = 1 if the de-trended series is greater than one standard deviation above its mean; otherwise FDI-surge = 0. Data are from World Bank (2015).
Control variables Source Website
annual rate of consumer price inflation World Bank (2015) http://data.worldbank.org/ data-catalog/worlddevelopment-indicator government spending ÷ GDP World Bank (2015) log real per capita GDP World Bank (2015) annual rate of real GDP growth World Bank (2015) (imports + exports) ÷ GDP World Bank (2015) capital account openness index Chinn and Ito (2006) http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/ Chinn-Ito_website.htm capital account liberalization Chinn and Ito (2006) control of corruption index Kaufman et al. (2009) www.govindicators.org/ assets of three largest banks ÷ total bank assets Čihák et al. (2012) see above
